We provide new insights into the determinants of acquirer announcement returns with a unique sample of targets that are acquired within three years of their IPOs. Existing studies of acquisitions of private and established public targets find positive relations between acquirer announcement returns and prior target valuation changes. In our sample of recently listed targets, we measure the prior target valuation change as the return from the IPO offer price to two weeks before the acquisition. Inconsistent with the behavioral biases based on prospect theory studied in the related literature, the relation between acquirer announcement returns and targets' returns since their IPOs is negative. We separate our target prior return variable into two components, the target's first day return (IPO underpricing) and the return from the first day close until two weeks before the acquisition (Prior return). We contend that IPO underpricing is a proxy for target valuation uncertainty and Prior return is a proxy for target distress-related bargaining power. The positive relations of these two variables to other proxies for target valuation uncertainty and target distress support our interpretation. Both IPO underpricing and Prior return have significantly negative relations with acquirer announcement returns. Therefore, our empirical findings show that rational causes related to target valuation uncertainty and bargaining power explain a large part of the effect that prior target valuation changes have on acquirer announcement returns. Our study also adds to the debate over how much rational actions, as opposed to irrational behaviors, affect major corporate events.
Introduction
One of the striking results of the recent empirical literature is that target valuations that precede an acquisition announcement by several months or even years appear to positively impact acquirer announcement returns. For a sample of private targets, Cooney, Moeller, and Stegemoller (2009) find that increases in target valuations from a withdrawn initial public offering (IPO) price to a subsequent acquisition lead to more positive acquirer announcement returns. For a sample of public acquirers, Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009) report that changes from targets' 52-week high share prices inflate takeover offer premiums and the more the offer premiums are inflated by the targets' 52-week high, the more negative is the effect of the offer premiums on acquirer announcement returns. Thus, consistent with Cooney et al. (2009) , Baker et al. (2009) find that the change from a prior target valuation (i.e., a 52-week high price) to a price just before an acquisition offer is positively related to acquirer announcement returns. While Cooney et al. (2009) and Baker et al. (2009) find similar empirical results, their conclusions differ substantially. Cooney et al. (2009) mainly attribute the positive effect of changes from targets' prior valuations on acquirer announcement returns to rational compensation for the assumption of target valuation uncertainty while Baker et al. (2009) conclude that the effect is driven by deal participants who are irrationally biased in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory. 1 In order to address the seemingly contradictory conclusions regarding the importance of behavioral and rational explanations for the relevance of prior target valuations in acquisitions of private and public targets, we examine acquisitions of targets that are acquired within three years after their IPOs. Our targets are in a unique niche between private and established public firms.
Similar to private targets, many recent IPO firms need to raise additional capital, forcing them to negotiate with potential investors, including acquirers, even in unfavorable conditions. As public 1 We use the term "prior target valuation" to describe an observed target value sometime before the acquisition announcement. In our study, the term refers to the target's IPO issue and first-day-close prices. When discussing the related literature, the term refers to the valuation related to a withdrawn IPO (Cooney et al., 2009) or to the 52-week high price (Baker et al., 2009 ). targets, recently listed firms have observable market prices. However, due to their short public track records, recently listed targets retain a meaningful amount of opaqueness and valuation uncertainty. Similar to the samples of private and public targets studied in the existing literature, our sample provides a natural reference price point associated with an important corporate eventthe IPO price. The IPO price is particularly meaningful because it incorporates information from managers, private owners, underwriters, and IPO investors.
2 Additionally, the firm's managers have more control over the IPO price and the timing of the IPO than over the stock's 52-week high price. Therefore, ex ante, the behavioral explanations related to anchoring on the IPO price may be especially important in the sample of recently listed targets. Overall, this rich setting is well-suited to examine behavioral and rational effects on acquisition pricing and helps us distinguish the importance of behavioral and rational explanations for the relevance of prior target valuations in the pricing of acquisitions.
We measure the target valuation change as the return from the IPO offer price to two weeks before the acquisition (Return since IPO). Similar to Cooney et al. (2009) and Baker et al. (2009), we find that changes from prior target valuations affect acquirer announcement returns. In contrast to the positive relation between target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns in those two papers, in our sample this relation is negative.
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Our first insight is that our results are inconsistent with behavioral biases based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 ) that describes how past valuations affect individuals' 2 Anecdotal evidence that IPO prices play an important role in acquisitions of recently listed targets is indicated in SEC Form S-4 filings. For example, Bear Stearns, an advisor to Providence Journal, a target of an acquisition bid by Belo Corp., "noted that the price of Providence Journal Class A Common Stock on September 23, 1996 of $20.75 reflected an approximate 38% premium to its IPO price of $15.00, and that the Merger Consideration to be received by the holders of Providence Journal Common Stock pursuant to the Merger would likely be valued at a substantial premium to such September 23, 1996 closing stock price. Bear Stearns noted that these factors were among the primary factors in assessing the fairness, from a financial point of view, of the Merger" (Belo Corp., S-4 filed January 7, 1997). In another instance, Morgan Stanley, an advisor to PayPal during an acquisition bid by eBay, calculated implied premiums based on, among other, PayPal's IPO price (eBay Inc., S-4 filed August 6, 2002).
assessments of current values. If target managers anchor their valuations on a target's IPO price, they regard target price declines from the IPO price as unjustified losses and target price increases from the IPO price as "windfall" gains. With this assessment, target managers negotiate harder after target price declines than after target price increases. Acquirer managers can suffer from similar biases as the target managers. If they also anchor on the target's IPO value, a target price decline would cause the acquirer managers to negotiate less aggressively because they are getting a "good deal." A price increase would lead to more aggressive bargaining. Alternatively, acquirer managers rationally try to minimize the acquisition price. Either way, target price declines should cause inflated acquisition prices, implying lower acquirer announcement returns. Empirically, the negative relation between target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns in our sample contradicts this prediction.
The negative relation of targets' Return since IPO with acquirer announcement returns is consistent with two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, rational explanations: (i) bargaining power of the target and (ii) acquirer assumption of target valuation uncertainty. To distinguish these two rational explanations, we use the two components of Return since IPO, the target's first day return (IPO underpricing) and the return from the first day close until two weeks before the acquisition (Prior return). While IPO underpricing reflects the initial assessment of a private firm that just became public, Prior return measures the post-IPO track record of a public firm. We contend that IPO underpricing is a proxy for target valuation uncertainty while Prior return is a proxy for target distress-related bargaining power.
Our evidence supports target IPO underpricing as a proxy for target (valuation) uncertainty. 4 We find a positive correlation of target IPO underpricing with two alternative proxies for valuation uncertainty: the standard deviation of target industry market-to-book ratios (Industry M/B stdev) and the standard deviation of target post-IPO returns (Target return stdev). In our sample, IPO underpricing and acquirer announcement returns are negatively related. This negative relation is more pronounced during times of elevated uncertainty, i.e., when relatively more high growth and high tech firms go public during the IPO bubble years. So the inclusion of the IPO bubble years of the 1990s in our sample helps us identify an effect of target valuation risk on acquirer announcement returns that might be harder to detect in samples with less risky targets.
Several reasons can explain the negative relation of target valuation uncertainty and acquirer announcement returns in our sample: (i) effects of acquirer manager hubris (Roll, 1986 ) may be more pronounced in acquisitions of hard-to-value targets; (ii) acquirer shareholders may be more concerned about risk than acquirer managers whose concerns can be offset by acquisition-related private benefits; and (iii) unlike in acquisitions of private targets, the acquirer may need to absorb the public target's valuation uncertainty without compensation because it cannot negotiate a discount to an observable target market price. The first two points can explain the difference between our results and the results for public targets reported by Baker et al. (2009) because compared to an average public target, the recent IPO targets in our sample are likely harder-tovalue and more risky. Point (iii) is especially salient in explaining why we find a negative relation between target valuation uncertainty and acquirer announcement returns while Cooney et al.
(2009) find a positive one.
Finally, we find evidence that Prior return is a proxy for the target bargaining power. Low bargaining power can arise from the target's need to obtain capital after the IPO, in particular, when its prospects have deteriorated. Therefore, low Prior return should indicate the target's poor ability and high urgency to raise capital. If the target has performed well (high Prior return), it should be in a strong bargaining position because it likely has less urgency and more choice to raise money. Consequently, Prior return and target bargaining power should be positively related and target bargaining power and acquirer announcement returns should be negatively related.
Several results support this explanation. First, target returns since the IPO are negatively related to acquirer announcement returns. Second, targets with low returns since their IPOs tend to have low ratios of net income to total assets and high cash burn rates, i.e., negative ratios of cash flows from operations to cash holdings. Third, low (high) target net income to total assets ratios and high (low) target cash burn rates are associated with high (low) acquirer announcement returns.
Finally, in multivariate regressions, target net income to assets ratios, target cash burn rates, and
Prior return overlap in explaining acquirer announcement returns.
Our paper contributes to the literature studying the determinants of acquirer announcement returns, in particular with respect to the relevance of behavioral and rational explanations for the effects of prior target valuation changes on acquisition prices. In our sample, acquirer announcement returns are negatively related to target post-IPO returns. Our distinct sample of newly public targets allows us to conduct tests to distinguish behavioral and rational explanations of acquisition pricing in an environment where target valuation uncertainty, target financial distress, and the effects of behavioral biases are likely important. We are able to reject the hypothesis that behavioral biases based on prospect theory affect acquirer announcement returns in this environment. Instead, we find support for rational explanations related to target valuation uncertainty and target bargaining power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our sample and section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 explores the two components of prior target returns and the implications for acquirer announcement returns. We consider alternative explanations and conduct robustness tests in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Data
We identify 11,135 completed U.S. (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002) . Our higher relative size restriction likely contributes to our acquirer announcement returns being more negative than the number in Moeller et al. (2004) . Although our targets only recently became public, our sample deals are more similar to average public acquisitions than to private acquisitions in terms of
Acquirer CAR.
As defined in the introduction, we focus on three measures of targets' past valuation changes: Prior market return, the return of the CRSP equal-weighted index from the IPO date to two weeks before the acquisition announcement, averages 55% with a median of 43.4%.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 16% of acquisitions are paid with at least 90% cash (Cash).
The SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database classifies only 0.6% of our acquisitions as hostile (Hostile) 8 and 15.3% as tender offers (Tender). About 53% of the targets in our sample were backed by venture capitalists (VCs) at the time of the IPOs. Approximately 54% (10%) of the targets went public during hot (cold) IPO periods. We define hot and cold IPO periods based on the monthly volume of IPO issuance as in Helwege and Lian (2004) . Specifically, we calculate three-month centered moving averages of the number of IPOs for each month in the sample using data reported in Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994) and updated through 2008 on Jay Ritter's website. Following Helwege and Lian (2004) , hot periods are defined as months for which the number of IPOs exceeds the top quartile of the moving average. Cold periods are defined as 8 In addition to the SDC classification, Schwert (2000) uses characterizations of hostility in the Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones News Retrieval, unnegotiated tender offers, "bear hugs," pre-takeover 13D filings, merger rumors about the target, and principal component analysis to identify hostile deals. Overall, he concludes that "most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part of the bargaining process." (p. 2599) months for which the number of IPOs is less than the bottom third of the moving average. Cash burn is an indicator variable set equal to one if the ratio of the target's cash flow from operations to cash in the prior fiscal year falls into the bottom 20% of the in-sample distribution and zero otherwise. 
Results
We first test whether target post-IPO valuation changes affect acquirer announcement returns.
Univariate results
In Table 2 , we first divide our sample into terciles based on our three measures of the target valuation changes and our alternative target bargaining power and uncertainty proxies. Then we calculate the average and median Acquirer CAR for the bottom and top terciles of each variable of interest. We find that lower target valuation changes are generally associated with higher Acquirer CAR. While the bottom Return since IPO tercile has a mean Acquirer CAR of -0.6%, the top tercile has a mean of -3.1%; the difference is significant at the 0. We next study the target bargaining explanation. We contend that all else equal poor performance and the need for outside funds weaken a target's bargaining position vis-à-vis a potential acquirer. Our proxies for a target's need to raise outside funding are Prior return, Target cash flow/ cash, and Target net income/ assets. The mean Acquirer CAR for the bottom and top
Prior return terciles are -0.6% and -2.6%, respectively. The difference in means is statistically insignificant. Similarly, higher values of Target cash flow/ cash and Target net income/ assets are associated with lower average Acquirer CAR, but the differences are not significant. In addition, the median Acquirer CAR for both the bottom and top terciles of each variable are almost identical.
It is possible that our target cash flow and net income ratios do not identify sufficiently financially distressed targets or that the effects on Acquirer CAR are nonlinear. To examine this possibility, we use the Cash burn indicator variable. We find that Cash burn is associated with significantly higher mean and median Acquirer CAR. The mean difference is 5.5% and significant at the 0.01 level, the median difference is somewhat smaller but also significant at the 0.01 level.
Overall, the univariate evidence is consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, but is statistically significant for only one of the proxies. IPO underpricing has been shown to be related to various uncertainty proxies. Rock (1986) constructs an adverse-selection model and proposes that the presence of asymmetric information explains the systematic underpricing of IPOs. Michaely and Shaw (1994) find support for the theoretical prediction of the adverse-selection model. Finally, Lowry et al. (2009) report that "IPO initial return variability is considerably higher when the fraction of difficult-to-value companies going public (young, small, and technology firms) is higher." Prior literature also relied on Industry M/B stdev as a measure of target valuation uncertainty (Cooney et al., 2009 
Regression results

Our dependent variable is Log acquirer CAR, the natural logarithm of (1 + Acquirer CAR).
We initially focus on the measure of the target's post-IPO stock price performance, Return since IPO, and its two components, Prior return and IPO underpricing. To reduce the impact of outliers, we use the natural logarithm of (1 + the respective return variable) in the regressions.
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We include acquisition year dummy variables in all regressions with Log acquirer CAR as the dependent variable to account for time variations in acquisition profitability. In column 1 of with an equity market value of $829 million. For the median target with a market value of equity of $151 million, the $16 million accounts for about 10.7% of its equity value.
In column 3, we add Log acquirer market-to-book ratio. We note that because Acquirer market-to-book is substantially correlated with Prior return (0.33 using the natural logarithms), adding the market-to-book ratio to the regressions can cause multicollinearity which makes the interpretation of the results potentially difficult. While the coefficient on Log return since IPO becomes less negative, it remains significant at the 0.1 level. Overall, we find robust evidence that prior target valuation changes affect acquirer announcement returns. In contrast to acquisitions of private and established public firms, the relation between valuation changes of newly public targets and acquirer announcement returns is negative. This negative relation is robust to the inclusion of control variables known to be related to the acquirer announcement returns and to time period effects. We conclude that behavioral biases based on prospect theory are an unlikely explanation for the acquirer announcement returns in acquisitions of newly public targets. Furthermore, the evidence suggests there are two other fundamental causes of why prior targets' valuation changes are negatively related to acquirer announcement returns: target's bargaining power and target valuation uncertainty which appears particularly important during periods of high market-wide uncertainty. In the next section, we explore these two hypotheses in more depth.
Target bargaining power and valuation uncertainty
We study whether the two components of target Return since IPO are related to particular target characteristics. First, we examine whether Prior return proxies for a target's ability and urgency to raise capital that should affect the target's bargaining power. Second, we study whether IPO underpricing is related to proxies for target valuation uncertainty measured close to the acquisition announcement date. Finally, we provide additional evidence for the target bargaining power and target valuation uncertainty hypotheses.
We begin by using regression analysis to study the correlations of Prior return and IPO underpricing with alternative proxies for target funding needs and target valuation uncertainty, respectively. In Panel A of This difference is statistically significant at 0.01 level. Time to acquisition is generally significantly negative, consistent with the well-known fact that returns of IPO firms decline over time (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) . 15 Not surprisingly, results in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that targets that have trouble generating sufficient cash or earnings tend to have low stock returns.
In Panel B of The regressions in Table 5 should be interpreted as analyses of correlation, not as claims of causality. For example, it is reasonably impossible that future return standard deviations cause past IPO underpricing. Our point is that target IPO underpricing is positively correlated with proxies for target valuation uncertainty and Prior return is a reasonable proxy for a target's bargaining power related to its need and ability to obtain internal or external cash.
In Table 6 , we examine how our proxies for target bargaining power and valuation Log industry M/B stdev do not change dramatically and remain statistically significant. 16 In unreported tests, we use additional measures of uncertainty: the standard deviation of daily returns of all firms going public during a particular month (Lowry et al., 2009 ), a target development indicator (Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller, 2009) , and target firm age (obtained from http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm). Only the standard deviation of daily returns of all firms going public during a particular month is significantly positively related to IPO underpricing.
In addition to the variables in column 3, the regression in column 4 includes the two components of the Log return since IPO, namely Log prior return and Log IPO underpricing, as well as Log prior market return. The coefficient on Log prior return is insignificantly negative with a p-value of 0.15 while the effect of Cash burn is weaker than in columns 1 and 3, yet still significant at the 0.1 level. Target net income/ assets loses its significance. With respect to target valuation uncertainty, Log IPO underpricing retains a significantly negative coefficient while Log Industry M/B stdev loses its statistical significance. These results confirm what the regressions in Table 5 showed. Prior return captures the target bargaining power as related to its ability and urgency to raise capital. IPO underpricing proxies for target valuation uncertainty. The overlap of informational content among the target prior return, bargaining power, and valuation uncertainty measures can also be seen when we compare the regression coefficients in column 4 of Table 6 to the regression coefficients in column 6 of Table 3 (repeated in column 6 of Table 6 for convenience). Specifically, both coefficients on Log prior return and Log IPO underpricing become less negative with less significant p-values. In the case of Log prior return, the coefficient decreases by approximately 30% and becomes insignificant.
Finally, in column 5 we include Log acquirer market-to-book. As expected, the significance of almost all other explanatory variables declines compared to the regression in column 4.
However, IPO underpricing and Cash burn remain significant with p-values of 0.051 and 0.062, respectively.
We note that our results show a negative relation between target uncertainty and acquirer announcement returns. This negative relation is consistent with several explanations. There may be more pronounced effects of acquirer managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) in acquisitions of hard-tovalue targets. Alternatively, acquirer shareholders may be more concerned about target's risk than acquirer managers whose concerns can be offset by acquisition-related private benefits. These two points could explain the apparent difference between our results and the results reported by Baker et al. (2009) . Another possibility why we find a negative relation between target uncertainty and acquirer announcement return is that unlike in acquisitions of private targets, the acquirer may need to absorb the public target's valuation uncertainty without compensation because it cannot negotiate a discount to an observable target market price. This point is especially salient in explaining why we find a negative relation between target valuation uncertainty and acquirer announcement returns while Cooney et al. (2009) 
Robustness and alternative explanations
We consider alternative explanations and examine the robustness of our results.
Coinsurance
Low prior target returns are a measure of poor target performance. Poor target performance can affect acquirer announcement returns when acquisitions of targets with diminished prospects reduce shareholder (option) value by subsidizing the targets' creditors. Consider a simple example (symmetric information, risk neutrality, no synergies). A target's value as an independent firm is -50 or 100, with equal probability. The value of its equity is 50 because shareholders will default if the unfavorable outcome occurs. Suppose an acquirer has a value of 50 or 200, also with equal probability. Its equity value is 125. If the values of acquirer and target are perfectly correlated, the combined firm is worth either 300 or zero, resulting in an equity value of 150. If the values of acquirer and target are uncorrelated, the combined firm is worth 300, 150, 150, or zero with equal probabilities, also resulting in an equity value of 150. Yet, the minimum acquisition price that target shareholders would accept is 50, the equity value of the independent target. Therefore, in an acquisition, the acquirer shareholders' wealth will decline by at least 25 (from 125 to 100).
Acquirer managers might pursue such a transaction because they get private benefits from running larger firms, empire-building, or increased diversification. Alternatively, managers might simply overestimate synergies. This coinsurance example predicts that negative target valuation changes are associated with lower acquirer announcement returns. Because empirically we find the opposite result, we conclude that the coinsurance effect does not explain our results.
Synergies
The effects of prior target returns and our alternative proxies for target bargaining power and valuation uncertainty can also be interpreted in the context of synergies. It is possible that less profitable and cash-deprived targets provide opportunities for larger synergies with a better capitalized acquirer. Further, risky target firms can make accomplishing synergies more challenging. However, it is unlikely that the target post-IPO performance variables are proxies for the likelihood of creating synergistic gains. Furthermore, the combined announcement return of target and acquirer is highly correlated with the acquirer announcement return and therefore not conducive to disentangling the effects of synergies from target bargaining power and valuation uncertainty. We acknowledge that our results might to some extent reflect synergies. However,
given the high correlation of the combined announcement return of target and acquirer with
Acquirer CAR, we believe that focusing on the effects of target bargaining and valuation uncertainty explanations on acquirer announcement returns is more appropriate.
Markup pricing
Another potential explanation of the negative relation between prior target returns and acquirer announcement returns is based on markup pricing (Schwert, 1996) . Under markup pricing, the target's pre-announcement runup is unrelated to post-announcement increases in the target's stock price. Therefore, the pre-announcement runup constitutes an additional cost to acquirers. This explanation implies that acquirers do not take into account targets' recent stock price runups when they determine what premiums to offer. Consequently, they overpay for targets with positive price runups. Applied to our study, markup pricing implies that the acquirers' announcement returns should be lower when the targets experience higher prior returns.
Similar to Schwert (1996) , we calculate Runup as the target return in excess of the equalweighted CRSP index. We use a runup period from 60 days to one day before the acquirer announcement return window. When added to our main regressions in columns 3, 5, and 6 of Table 3 , Runup has a positive point estimate, but is insignificant and does not meaningfully affect the other coefficients (results not tabulated). We conclude that our target post-IPO valuation change variables do not measure a runup effect similar to Schwert (1996) .
Investor irrationality
Investors might suffer from similar behavioral biases as target managers in our prospect theory explanation. If investors regard a target's IPO value as its appropriate valuation, then any acquisition price above that level indicates an overpriced target, and vice versa. Acquisitions of overpriced (underpriced) targets should lead to low (high) acquirer announcement returns. While this explanation is consistent with our empirical results for target post-IPO valuation changes, it relies on ad hoc market inefficiency and investor irrationality. Furthermore, in unreported analyses, when we add Target market-to-book to the regressions analyzing acquirer announcement returns, it has consistently positive coefficients, with some being statistically significant. If Target market-to-book is a measure of mispricing as perceived by the irrational investors, its coefficient in regressions analyzing Acquirer CAR should be negative. Therefore, we favor our rational explanations.
Conclusions
We provide new insights into the determinants of acquirer announcement returns and the importance of prior target valuation changes for acquisition pricing with a unique sample of acquisitions that occur within three years of a target's IPO.
In contrast to the positive relation between target valuation changes and announcement returns to acquirers of private and established public firms reported in the prior literature, this relation is negative in our sample. It is the opposite of the prediction based on behavioral biases related to prospect theory. We propose two rational explanations for the relation between prior target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns: target bargaining power and target valuation uncertainty.
Splitting our target valuation change measure into two components, Prior return and IPO underpricing, gives us a unique opportunity to test the importance of these rational explanations.
We contend that Prior return is a proxy for target bargaining power and IPO underpricing is a proxy for target valuation uncertainty. Our empirical tests support these claims and show that both proxies are significantly related to acquirer announcement returns. While the effect of Prior return seems to be present in all subsamples, the impact of IPO underpricing appears to be driven by the comparably more risky targets that went public during the IPO bubble. These rational explanations for the significant relation of prior target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns are both supported by our results and arguably more appealing than explanations that rely on behavioral biases.
The effects of prior valuation changes on corporate events are particularly useful to test the appropriateness of rational versus behavioral theories because researchers can focus on welldefined events instead of having to rely on long-term return studies that may suffer from a joint hypothesis problem. The research area would benefit from comprehensive theoretical models that provide additional guidance for further empirical tests. Return since IPO is the target's return from the IPO offer price to two weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. Prior return is the target's return from the first trading day closing price to two weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. IPO underpricing is the target's first trading day return. Acquirer market-to-book is calculated as (market value of equity + total assets -book value of equity) divided by total assets. Relative size is the ratio of target to acquirer market value of equity. Acquirer and Target market value represent the market values of equity. Time to acquisition is the number of years between the IPO and the subsequent acquisition announcement. Target cash flow/ cash is the ratio of the target's cash flow from operating activities to cash and short-term investments. Target net income/ assets is the ratio of the target's net income to total assets. Industry M/B stdev is the standard deviation of the market-to-book ratios of firms in the same industry with assets between half and twice the target assets. All variables are measured at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition announcement, except for the market value of equity that uses the earliest available date when it is unavailable at the end of the prior fiscal year. Target return stdev is the standard deviation of the daily target returns from the IPO date to two weeks before the acquisition announcement. Prior market return is the return of the equal-weighted CRSP index from the IPO date to two weeks before the acquisition announcement. In Panel B, Cash equals one when at least 90% of the acquisition price is paid with cash. Hostile captures the deal attitude and Tender indicates the use of a tender offer. VC denotes presence of a venture capital firm at the IPO. These three variables are from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database. Hot and Cold IPO markets are based on the monthly volume of IPO issuance as in Helwege and Lian (2004) . Cash burn equals 1 if Target cash flow/ cash is in the bottom 20% of all sample firms. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log return since IPO -0.0299*** -0.0188* -0.0055 
